Michael J. Flynn, Mass. State Bar No.172780 1 P.O. Box 690, 6125 El Tordo Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067 (858) 775-7624; Fax: (858) 759-0711 3 Admitted Pro Hac Vice Former Attorney for the Montgomery parties 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 DISTRICT OF NEVADA, RENO 9 DENNIS MONTGOMERY, and the 3:06-CV-00056-PMP-VPC 10 MONTGOMERY FAMILY TRUST, **BASE FILE** 11 Plaintiffs, 3:06-CV-00145-PMP-VPC 12 3:06-CV-0263-PMP-VPC ETREPPID TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 13 WARREN TREPP, and the UNITED FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 14 15 Defendants. 16 AND ALL RELATED MATTERS. 17 18 TO ALL PARTIES AND ATTORNEY OF RECORD: Attorney Michael Flynn (hereinafter 19 20 21

"counsel"), who was admitted pro hac vice in the above captioned cases, move this Court for an Order requiring Dennis Montgomery, individually and as Trustee of the Montgomery Family Trust, Brenda Montgomery, individually and as Trustee of the Montgomery Family Trust, and the Montgomery Family Trust (hereinafter collectively "Montgomery"), in the above captioned cases and the related search warrant matter, 3:06-cv-0263, to pay all of the outstanding fees and costs currently owed to Mr. Flynn, and to other attorneys who worked for him, in connection with the underlying actions. All such fees and costs were incurred in connection with the actions presently pending before this Court. Montgomery terminated counsel on August 1, 2007.

This Motion is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and Declaration of Michael Flynn, and Amended Notice of Lien, and all papers on file in these three aforementioned

Motion for Fees & Costs

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cases. This Court must apply Nevada laws, including Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct. to this Motion. See Local Rules of Practice of the United States District of Nevada, LR 1A 10-2 (b) (8-9); LR 10-7A.

For the above reasons, attorney Michael Flynn respectfully request that this Motion be granted and that Montgomery be required to pay all fees and costs as required by law. A proposed Order is attached.

Respectfully submitted,

/S/

Dated: August 21, 2007 Michael J. Flynn, Esq.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Motion for Payment of Unpaid Fees and Costs is based on the work of four attorneys (hereinafter referred to as "counsel") covering a span of over *eighteen* months and involving unpaid fees and costs for a period over six months involving at least three intensely litigated matters all before this Court. This Motion is based on five theories of recovery including express written promises of payment for the fees and costs actually charged, written and oral promises to pay an hourly fee on an "account stated", implied promises for services rendered, quantum meruit, and fraud. The fees charged have never been contested or "disputed" by the Montgomerys, or Montgomery's business "partner," Edra Blixseth.

In a "meet and confer," conducted on July 31, 2007, and August 13, 2007, one of Montgomery's new counsel, Terri Pham, stated that she did not have "authority" to discuss the fee issues. Thus, although the fees exceeding \$625,000.00, and over \$10,000 in costs have not been paid, they have never been *disputed*. Montgomery and Blixseth always praised attorneys Flynn and DiMare's work.

¹ For all of the reasons set forth herein, this matter is distinguishable from the recent case of *Ecomares Inc. v Schaefer*, 2007 U.S. dist. LEXIS 50491.

Instead, Montgomery and his partner, Edra Blixseth, and *her* divorce lawyers in her "billion dollar divorce" currently being litigated in California, Ms. Klar and Ms. Pham, chose to sue counsel in the Los Angeles superior court with a sham complaint seeking injunctive relief to obtain counsel's files and "gag" orders under California law and California Rules of Professional Conduct for matters solely related to what they call the "Nevada disputes." *Their real purpose is to protect Edra Blixseth in her billion dollar divorce case*. Their California lawsuit is based on false allegations and driven by Montgomery's and Blixseth's fears that evidence in the "Nevada disputes," which began to emerge following this Court's unsealing of the Michael West declaration on or about April 9, 2007, will substantially and adversely impact Ms. Blixseth's billion dollar divorce. Hence, the filing of a sham complaint in California by Blixseth's divorce lawyers under the pretense of representing Montgomery. Edra Blixseth is very likely paying them and they are working for her in plainly conflicted circumstances with Montgomery.

Except for the filing of that baseless law suit, counsel would not be filing this Motion at this time, would not be asserting the facts in the foregoing paragraph, and would not be asserting certain positions herein. But counsel must defend himself here and now, and litigate the issues *in this Court, relating to the proper forum to resolve the non-payment of his fees and costs.* That forum is this Court. Montgomery and his lawyers have fabricated allegations to get this case to California. During the hearing on August 17, 2007 the Court inquired why the California Court should not resolve the relief sought in the California complaint. Counsel responded that jurisdiction and venue reside in this Court and that counsel's position on the Court's inquiry would be set forth in this Motion. For that reason, counsel is responding to the Court's inquiry with this written motion taking care not to divulge client confidences or prejudice Montgomery. This Court has the power to stop needless litigation, stop continued delay of these cases, resolve issues, and get to the "truth." If this Court grants this motion, the California case will abruptly end. ²

In sum, the short answer to the Court's question is that the issues underlying this Motion and the California complaint are identical, and these issues should be resolved in Nevada. But

² In California Federal Court, counsel is also filing a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer.

Montgomery's new lawyers filed the California action on behalf of Edra Blixseth, who is also legally responsible for the fees and costs, because of issues relating to her divorce action. As this Court has undoubtedly discerned, all of the issues relating to non-payment of the fees and costs sought in this Motion as set forth herein, lie just beneath the surface of the California complaint. Montgomery and Ms. Blixseth now have the option of paying the fees without further litigation by evaluating this Motion and doing the right thing. An unresolved fee disputehere may have grave implications for Ms. Blixseth's divorce action, and attorneys Pham and Klar likely know why.

In this Motion, notwithstanding the false allegations now publicly made against him, ³ counsel will only assert the *bare minimum* of facts for this Court to retain jurisdiction and venue and resolve these fee issues. Counsel will not inform the Court at this point of very specific facts impacting both Montgomery and Ms. Blixseth here and in the California divorce action disclosed to counsel by Montgomery. Local counsel have been advised of these facts and presumably have advised Ms. Klar and Ms. Pham. Attacking Mr. Flynn will not work.

Several of the attorneys routinely worked seven days a week, twelve plus hours a day to protect the interests of the Montgomery parties. These include Dennis Montgomery, individually and as Trustee of the Montgomery Family Trust, Brenda Montgomery, individually and as Trustee of the Montgomery Family Trust and the Trust itself, (hereinafter the "Montgomery parties"). Not once throughout the *eighteen* months did counsel hear a single murmur about the legitimacy, the amounts, the work performed, or any challenge whatsoever to the fees and costs, until counsel began to question the credibility of Montgomery in May - June, 2007. In fact, their work was consistently praised and approved by Montgomery and their "partners" with repeated promises of payment right up though May, 2007.

In May-June, 2007, counsel explicitly stated their intentions to withdraw based primarily on the conduct of Montgomery and his "partners", and secondarily for non-payment of fees and costs. Then Dennis Montgomery claimed he was unable to pay the fees. If Montgomery continues to assert this frivolous position in response to this Motion, counsel will respond with detailed facts. During the

³ The Reno Gazette Journal recently reported Montgomery's allegations as "fraud" against counsel.

same period, counsel went continually deeper in the hole for unpaid fees and costs; but kept working based on repeated promises of payment, and partial payments made to keep counsel working.

Significantly, counsel also kept working based on their *belief* that vital national security interests were at stake in the war on terror; and that the nefarious political clout of Warren Trepp and his henchmen in Washington were actually preventing the use of said technology. Comprehensive documentary, electronic, testimonial and circumstantial evidence *appeared* to support the *belief* that Montgomery's technology was vital to national security. Counsel bought into this *belief* hook, line and sinker, apparently as did the U.S. Government, its intelligence agencies, various branches of the military, and USSOCOM for over four years preceding April, 2007. Even then, it appeared that at least one agency still believed in the technology, as did counsel, thus falling deeper into debt to "protect" Montgomery and the technology.

Additionally, Montgomery's "partner", Ms. Blixseth, a reputed "billionaire," as well as her company, Opsprings, LLC, repeatedly promised to pay the fees, initially on the expressed altruistic motive to protect national security. It is now public knowledge that she made numerous trips to Washington allegedly to provide the technology and its "output" to high level administration officials. As revealed in the recently unsealed declaration of Montgomery on August 3, 2007, (the same day Montgomery, using Blixseth's lawyers, sued counsel in Los Angeles), this "output" allegedly involved "target coordinates" involving planned al Qaida attacks. When this Court unsealed Michael West's declaration on or about April 9, 2007 disclosing the alleged al Jazeera decoding, it became apparent that what counsel then believed and what, in fact, was actually happening in the smoke and mirrors world of "intelligence gathering" might be world's apart. The unsealing did unleash a tsunami of investigative efforts and inquiries by counsel, including a trip to Washington, which, in turn broadened into other areas. As circumstances then evolved it became apparent that counsel had to withdraw regardless of the unpaid fees and costs sought in this Motion. In sum, counsel's previous reliance and subsequent fact gathering necessitated withdrawal. The Montgomery parties have never contested the fees or the work performed. Their actions and promises are to the contrary.

Counsel's work was performed by seasoned attorneys with substantial experience and skills at significantly less than market rates because of their belief in the national security "cause." In the

context of all of the pleadings in this matter, that factor alone should have great weight in connection with counsel's quantum meruit claims. Great amounts of time, effort, research and legal work was devoted to this problem as reflected in counsel's invoices. This Court need only look at how much time and judicial resources it has devoted to the "national security" problems permeating thee cases.

This Court just recently conducted a hearing on said matters on August 17, 2007. The issues now before the Court in connection with the Motion to Withdraw are intermingled with this Motion for Payment of Fees, eg counsel's "retaining lien" intersects with the state secrets issues, which intersect with the transfer of the files, which intersect with payment of the fees. This Motion provides a vehicle for resolution of all such issues. Although the California complaint does not directly challenge the unpaid fees and costs, the effect of granting injunctive relief in that action will defeat counsel's fees for, inter alia, not transferring the files as required by California law, but subject to a retaining lien under Nevada law, which does not mandate file transfer absent payment. More importantly, the issues underlying this Motion are the same as those underlying the California complaint.

II.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND FACTS.

A. The underlying issues permeating this motion require resolution if the Montgomery's do not pay the fees and costs.

The most significant issues and facts, including "partnership" issues between Blixseth and Montgomery, actually precipitating counsel's Motion to Withdraw filed on July 9, 2007, none of which involved the legitimacy of the fees, but which underlie almost all of the work performed, and the current fees outstanding, erupted in connection with facts discovered between April-June, 2007. The unsealing of substantial portions of the search case file on or about April 9, 2007, and issues and facts relating to a Grand Jury subpoena issued in late March, 2007, triggered a sequence of discovery and disclosure, including a trip to Washington D.C. by counsel to meet with Department of Justice attorneys, which, in turn, triggered extensive inquiry relating to the actual efficacy and actual use of the technology in the alleged decoding of al Jazeera satellite transmissions to al Qaida. That is why the fees and costs have not been paid.

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This Court's unsealing on August 3, 2007 of the Montgomery declaration cemented counsel's evolving knowledge gained since April, 2007 and caused Montgomeryto file his California action that same day. The reason is simple: counsel believed, relied upon, made decisions, received possession of Montgomery's "papers and property", and prepared declarations, memos, motions, defended him in the search proceedings etc, all on the fundamental premise that "vital national security interests" were at stake involving Montgomery's software, which he owned and exclusively possessed.

All of these issues and facts involve matters before this Court in this Motion either if the Montgomerys do not pay their bills or if the California case proceeds. They are an integral part not only to the disposition of this Motion, but also to the resolution of the conflicts between this Motion and the California action as hereinafter forth. Both the California court and this Court will be litigating these issues if the California case proceeds. Counsel will then be faced with a maelstrom of Blixseth supported litigation in California with millions of dollars in potential fees and costs, all to protect her in her divorce action under the guise of attorney client issues involving Montgomery. The issues common to both matters are very generally and generically set forth below as follows:⁴

- (1) Issues and facts relating to specific "on-going" conduct of Montgomery, which appears to be subject to Rule 3.3 (a) (3) and (b) of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, relating to Edra Blixseth in her divorce; and counsel's obligation to undertake "remedial measures."
- (2) Issues and facts relating to conduct, documents, and electronic media, and representations by Montgomery relating to his claims about the technology, and its use in the war on terror by certain agencies of the government.
- (3) Issues and facts relating to compliance with the Grand Jury subpoena.
- (4) Issues and facts relating to conduct and representations by Montgomery, Ms. Blixseth and their "partner" Michael Sandoval, and their software company, Opsprings LLC made to the U.S. Government.
- (5) Issues and facts relating to whether Montgomery's "source codes" and software were "never on

⁴ Counsel refers to the issues generically without reference to specific facts in order to avoid prejudice to Montgomery. In the event that the fees and costs become disputed, then an extensive documentary record in connection with the referenced issues and facts will become critical to the disposition of this Motion.

the premises of eTreppid" This is a core representation relied upon by counsel in these cases.

- (6) Issues and facts relating to the original executed Opsprings documents making Montgomery an "employee" of Blixseth's company; purported oral changes to those documents evolving over time and culminating in March April, 2007, when Blixseth "terminated" Sandoval, and made allegedly "new arrangements" with Montgomery.
- (7) Representations made to the Government by Blixseth, Montgomery and Sandoval between June, 2006 and March, 2007 relating to the technology, and when Blixseth and Sandoval possessed it, before Montgomery became an "employee" at Opsprings, which is to this day a rapidly evolving "discovery" issue.
- (8) Issues and facts relating to the "funding" of the "partnership" between Montgomery and Blixseth in May, 2007 in the context of the Blixseth divorce and certain Orders in that divorce matter.
- (9) Issues and facts relating to agreements, promises, and conduct between Montgomery, Sandoval and Blixseth *before* April, 2006 and *thereafter* relating to the technology.
- (10) Issues and facts relating to the procurement of federal contracts for use of the technology in the war on terror.
- (11) Multiple issues and facts relating to the credibility of Dennis Montgomery in connection with all three matters before this Court and also before the California court.

Again, Counsel would not even be raising these issues except for the filing of Montgomery's California suit against him based on patently fabricated allegations. If the California suit proceeds, or if this Motion is contested, the foregoing issues will be litigated. Ms. Blixseth's lawyers are playing Russian Roulette with Montgomery's rights in order to protect *her* in her divorce action. Montgomery, in turn, has legal claims against Blixseth to make her pay the unpaid fees. But for the filing of the California action by lawyers with overt conflicts of interest, ⁵ counsel would not be asserting this position at this time. But he will also be required to assert it in the pending Reply to his Motion to Dismiss that action. Thus, it is ripe for adjudication by this Court.

B. These cases involve issues requiring sophisticated legal skills and experience and diligent,

⁵ Counsel has notified of Ms. Pham and Klar of the unwaivable conflicts of interest involved, including but not limited to those cited above.

constant and consistent commitment of attorney time.

As the Court knows, these cases involve complex issues involving federal court jurisdiction and venue, copyright and intellectual property law, search and seizure, national security, state secrets law, partnership and business relationships, alleged bribery of the Nevada governor, intense media scrutiny initially organized and orchestrated by Edra Blixseth, a pending Washington D.C. Grand Jury investigation, and Montgomery's *claims* throughout the 18 months, relied upon by counsel, that extremely sophisticated software technology allegedly critical to the war on terror, was being used to decode all Jazeera satellite communications to all Qaida, and related technology used in other aspects of the war on terror.

The unsealing of Montgomery's declaration on August 3, 2007 (and the earlier unsealing of Michael West's declaration on April 9, 2007, on the subject of the decoding) by this Court speaks volumes about the government's position regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of Montgomery's technology. It also puts into perspective for counsel innumerable facts and evidence relating to Montgomery's and Warren Trepp's and *their* company, eTreppid's procurement of federal "top secret" military contracts based allegedly on bribes paid to then Congressman James Gibbons, including the infamous "cruise" attended by all three.

Montgomery claimed, as recited in innumerable court filings that the "source codes" involving said software were known only to him, owned by him, and were "never on the premises of eTreppid." Mr. Flynn, specifically, and counsel for Montgomery generally, relied upon and believed these core representations, as well as hundreds more. In light of all the "national security" concerns cloaking almost all aspects of these cases involving Montgomery's software and his work for the government, including *demonstrations*, all of the representations appeared reliable and accurate at the time they were made. Counsel devoted huge amounts of legal time and efforts to these issues as reflected in his invoices. There are specific facts critical to a quantum meruit analysis of the time and efforts devoted to these issues which counsel will omit from this Motion. In the event that the fees are disputed, counsel will file a supplemental pleading relating to these facts.

It appears that the government did pay tens of million of dollars to Montgomery's and Trepp's company; and that the relationship between Trepp, Gibbons and Montgomery, all of whom were on

the "cruise," is at issue.

Counsel herein who represented the comprehensive interests of the Montgomery parties on these complex issues, often under intense pressure and scrutiny from every side, did so with diligence, professionalism, success, honesty and integrity, which multiple judges of this Court have wrestled with for over a year and a half and continue to adjudicate.

C. The Montgomery's California action requires this Court to resolve the underlying issues.

Again, but for the filing of Montgomery's California action, counsel herein would not be compelled to put the foregoing issues before this Court. But Montgomery's attempt to put the same issues, ie, file transfer and a "gag" order before two different courts (potentially three courts if counsel was compelled to file a separate suit for their fees and costs against Edra Blixseth and Opspring) is not only based on false allegations, as discussed herein, it requires resolution of the underlying issues. Moreover, it will be a colossal waste of judicial time and resources.

The complaint in California seeking injunctive relief appears short and simple. It is not. It is a litigation wolf in the Liner Firm's clothing. The complex issues presently confronting this Court, some of which were heard on August 17th, directly impact numerous facts and issues underlying and concealed within the sham pleading brought by Montgomery and his lawyers in California. For example, even putting aside state secrets issues and facts relating to the redaction and transfer of counsel's files, and even putting aside the issue of counsel's Nevada "retaining lien", all now under submission with this Court, even if Montgomery paid the fees or posted a bond, and all of the redactions were made in compliance with the government's demands and certification to the Court, any potentially inconsistent ruling relating to the file transfer by the California court, however minimalist, may have a significant impact on evidence from counsel's files, particularly his email files if counsel only has a redacted copy and Montgomery has a full copy. Montgomery's counsel could then claim that they could not defend this Motion without using redacted material. The California court would be ill equipped to deal with this problem.

As the Court knows, issues already abound in connection with allegations that Montgomery has "fabricated" certain emails relating to the bribery of Gibbons by Trepp and the subject of a

Washington Grand Jury investigation. As those issues evolved in April - May, 2007, in connection with the Grand Jury subpoena, counsel demanded that Montgomery retain Washington counsel. Certain defenses were then raised in Washington inconsistent with counsel's understanding of the facts, which also precipitated withdrawal. The potential for rulings in three different courts, Washington, Nevada and California, in connection with said defenses obliquely referenced above, and going to the heart of several very significant issues before this Court may result in a quagmire of judicial confusion. The California action is superfluous, but the potential for judicial waste, inconsistency and/or error still obtains. Additional problems arise with respect to the requested "gag" order.

In order to issue a "gag" order under the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct or the California Rules - a ridiculous notion given Mr. Flynn's Nevada pro hac vice admission - the *facts* underlying the basis for any "gag" order all relate to the foregoing issues cited above and counsel's rights and duties to prosecute this Motion in this Court under Nevada law. For example, if Montgomery raises issues in the California court relating to *any of* the foregoing issues and facts involved in these cases before this Court, then this Court clearly has both jurisdiction and venue over the parties and the matters at issue. If Montgomery posts a bond and disputes the fees here on some grounds unrelated to the basis for his seeking a "gag" order in California (a legal and factual impossibility), he will have to make a factual showing in California that counsel has breached his fiduciary duties to Montgomery in connection with counsel's Nevada pro hac vice admission in the Nevada cases, because there is *no pro hac vice admission in California*, there is no underlying California case, counsel is not a "California lawyer", and the fabricated "holding himself out" theory could not be causally related to any conduct except matters involved in the Nevada cases.

Finally and conclusively, many of the issues and facts cited above constitute *defenses* under the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, to any conceivable basis for a "gag" order; and they constitute defenses and /or involve relevant evidence to any conceivable theory for defeating counsel's fees in this Motion. Indeed, if this Court GRANTED this Motion, any conceivable basis to issue any relief in California would be subject to the res judicata and/or collateral estoppel effect of this Court's ruling; and possibly subject to the doctrine of judicial estoppel depending on Montgomery's basis for

challenging the fees. In other words, any failure to raise facts or evidence in this Court and/or any failure to raise facts or evidence in the California action will estop Montgomery from doing so in the other matter. The effect of the relief Montgomery seeks in one matter directly impacts the relief sought in the other.

Even assuming some manufactured or fabricated basis to claim jurisdiction or venue in California, as Montgomery has already done with his "holding himself out" theory, which involves any alleged breach of a fiduciary duty, it has not been pled in the California complaint which only seeks injunctive relief for the file transfer and a "gag" order in connection with "Nevada disputes." Thus, there is no other basis before either court to supplant Nevada's patently clear jurisdiction and venue. Any new claims by Montgomery will have to be as equally fabricated as his "holding himself out" theory.

Thus, particularly given the serious credibility issues surrounding the Montgomery parties in the California complaint, also at issue in these cases, if the Montgomery's California action is transferred to this Court as appears likely, these issues must be resolved if Montgomery contests this Motion. If he doesn't, then the matter is res judicata. Moreover, two courts dealing with the same issues will result in a colossal waste of judicial time and resources; and the potential for inconsistent results. The California Court cannot presently resolve the file transfer issue until it resolves the Nevada lien issue which is squarely before this Court in this Motion. The California court cannot resolve the "gag" order issue without creating potentially inconsistent results in this Motion.

Among the numerous, intentionally false allegations in the complaint made to manufacture venue in California are the following: "Flynn led the plaintiffs to believe at that time [when representation commenced in January, 2006] that he was licensed to practice law in the state of California...." And that: "Throughout the course of his representation, Flynn held himself out to the Plaintiffs as a California lawyer." (See complaint, ¶7-8, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. These fabricated allegations were allegedly made to the Montgomerys in connection with Mr. Flynn's representation of Montgomery in the Nevada cases based on his pro hac vice admission before this Court. Thus, this Court has a compelling interest in resolving these allegations not only to preserve the interests of justice in Nevada, but to regulate the conduct of the lawyers who appear before Nevada

courts, as counsel did here. Additionally, if counsel committed this alleged fraud in these cases, then their entitlement to fees and costs is at issue here. Of course, the record will establish that said allegations are obviously fabricated by Dennis Montgomery and his lawyers, the Liner firm. The allegations are contrary to the established, incontrovertible, documentary record in the cases before this Court. Counsel will provide conclusive documentary proof on this issue to the Court at the appropriate time.

However, the falsity of these allegations raises not only very serious credibility issues about the Montgomery parties, they also raise significant ethical issues about Mr. Flynn's rights and responsibilities in this Motion relating to his challenges to Montgomery's credibility, which should be heard by this Court. Counsel is governed by the explicit language applying Nevada law in his pro hac vice admission. Counsel has herein exercised great restraint in this Motion. If counsel set forth a complete record involving the 18 months of litigation to date, on any of the underlying issues cited above, given the disclosures and revelations in the last several months, Montgomery's most recent "holding himself out" lie would provide perspective to the Court as to how we find ourselves in the situation we are in. Of course, all of this perspective is dependent upon this Courts', Judges Pro and Cooke, maintaining control over these cases. Different Judges in any future proceedings, civil or criminal, may alter a just and efficient result.

The reckless filing of said action premised on false allegations to obtain jurisdiction and venue in California now requires Mr. Flynn *in this Motion* to challenge the credibility of Dennis Montgomery, and to place at issue in this Court the reasons for his withdrawal as generically referenced in the foregoing issues. Otherwise, counsel's Motion here could be adversely impacted by the California action which has just commenced. Mr. Flynn will exercise restraint in this Motion, but there may be *volumes* of potential evidence relative to this issue. If Montgomery plans more fabrications to claim California jurisdiction, he will meet with greater problems than he already faces. Counsel is still conforming to the requirements of the attorney client privilege notwithstanding the Montgomery lies in the California complaint signed by Ms. Pham. This Court is the proper forum in the context of this Motion for Fees and Costs to resolve *all* of these and related issues.

Counsel filed an Amended "Notice" of lien in this Court on August 20, 2007 in connection

with this Motion.

III.

A.

ARGUMENT

in This Motion.

This Court possesses ancillary and/or supplemental jurisdiction over this Motion. "courts have long recognized that fee disputes arising from litigation pending before a district court fall within that court's ancillary jurisdiction. *Curry v Del Priore*, 941 F,2d 730, 731 (9th Cir., 1991). "Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 'to hear fee disputes between litigants and their attorneys when the dispute relates to the main action." *Alderman v Pan AmWorld Airways*, 169 F. 3d 1999, 102, (2nd Cir. 1999), citing *Cluett, Peabody &Co. v CPC Acquisition Co.*, 863 F2d 251, 256 (2nd Cir., 1988).

Only this Court possesses venue and jurisdiction over the matters and parties involved

Counsel have a "retaining lien" over the "papers and property" of Montgomery. Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16 (d) relying on Nevada case precedent; *Morse v State of Nevada*, 65 Nev. 275; 195 P.2d 199 (1948). This is a common law, non-statutory lien. *Id.* This Motion is made pursuant to the supplemental jurisdiction of the Court recited above, and pursuant to Nevada's common law recognition of a "retaining lien." *Id.* This Court has possessed exclusive jurisdiction and venue over these matters, the Montgomery parties, and their attorneys, for over *eighteen months*.

Nevada law also provides that a court having jurisdiction over an action also has jurisdiction to make orders and enter personal judgment on behalf of an attorney against his client in the underlying action. Nev. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18.015, and accompanying Notes; *Gordon v Stewart et al*, 74 Nev 115, 118, 324 P. 2d 234, 236 (1958). This case is distinguishable from the recent case of *Ecomares Inc. v Schaefer*, 2007 LEXIS 50491 (U.S. Dist. NV) (Judges Sandoval and Cooke). In that case, the moving law firm sought to convert a "lien" under N.R.S. 18.015 (1) into a "judgment" by virtue of a motion. The Court distinguished the *Gordon* case because it was a quantum meruit case and because in *Ecomares*, the client "disputed" the fee. Here, counsel are proceeding on quantum meruit, the fees has not yet been disputed, and counsel is not attempting to convert a lien into a judgment. Counsel simply want a finding and order that the fees are due and payable. If Montgomery contests or "disputes" the fees, then the underlying issues cited in this Memorandum can be resolved by this Court in the context

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27 28 of this Motion. Then counsel can proceed to convert the findings and order into a judgment or sue separately if he prevails. If Montgomery does not dispute the fees, then the *Ecomares* case does not apply.

Counsel has also filed on August 20, 2007 an "Amended Notice" of lien under said statute.

Substantial jurisdictional and venue impediments exist in the California action which will likely result in the transfer of that action to this Court. The Montgomery parties have no nexus to the Central District of California, either by domicile or residence in California. 6 Mr. Flynn has no domicile in California, or residence in the Central District, and there are extremely limited, if any, facts relating to these matters involving the Central District.

Allowing the California courts to adjudicate these issues will cause judicial waste, fuel injustice, slow down these proceedings, and likely create the potential for inconsistent results, as long as the same judges in Nevada continue to hear these matters. This Motion incorporates all of the issues and relief wrongfully sought in California, it recognizes the application of Nevada law to counsel's pro hac vice admission under all of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, it protects the Montgomery parties and former counsel against inconsistent results and unnecessary fees and costs, and it enables this Court to deal with the complex facts and issues presently confronting this Court involving the state secrets privilege, pending protective orders, the transfer and integrity of counsel's files, and counsel's Nevada "retaining lien."

Most significantly, this Motion gives this Court a vehicle and a process by which to deal with all of the foregoing issues, while the case proceeds.

Counsel's documents at issue in the file transfer process to new counsel can be rapidly dealt with by this Court in this Motion. If the fees and costs are paid as a result of this Motion, or at least adjudicated, then much of this Court's and counsel's burden in connection with collateral issues involving the attorney client privilege, the "retaining lien", the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, and the state secrets privilege can be summarily disposed of in the resolution of this Motion.

⁶ In the California case Montgomery and his lawyers falsely represented to the Court in the complaint that the Montgomery Family Trust is a citizen of California. In the related *Friendly Capital* Partners v. Montgomery case just weeks ago in Nevada they said the Trust was a citizen of Washington.

B. <u>Issues relating to the state secrets privilege require this Court to maintain exclusive</u> jurisdiction and venue.

As this Court knows, and took under submission on August 17, 2007, The United States Department of Defense, through Department of Justice attorneys, ("DoJ"), have filed a four part request in connection with the precise issues raised in the Montgomery parties' sham California complaint relating to the disposition of Mr. Flynn's files and what he says and to whom. The DoJ does not want Mr. Flynn (or anyone else) revealing the identity of certain government personnel to anyone, including the public at large, nor certain work performed by Montgomery on behalf of the Government and its intelligence agencies. Counsel herein have stipulated to all four conditions requested by the government. These issues permeate Mr. Flynn's files, particularly his emails with Montgomery, which are voluminous, and all of which involve the underlying Nevada cases. Thus, before this Court and the California Court, are the identical issues relating to Mr. Flynn's files, who gets them, (including parts of them that the government wants redacted), whether Mr. Flynn keeps the "papers and property" of Montgomery under Nevada law, the attorney client privilege, national security, software technology Montgomery contends he developed and used effectively in the war on terror; and the assertion of the state secrets privilege now narrowly constrained to the *identity* of certain personnel in a certain agency and work performed for them.

Going forward in two separate jurisdictions while attempting to maintain the integrity of the privilege, particularly given the complex redaction issues performed by this Court, and the possession of unredacted documents by so many different individuals, exponentially enhances the potential for inconsistent results - particularly where Montgomery, Gibbons and Trepp are likely to assert defenses relating to redacted documents in any related civil or criminal proceedings.

C. The unsealed Montgomery declaration with redactions raises issues and facts that can only be resolved by this Court in connection with this Motion.

Significantly, plaintiffs and their lawyers brought the action in the Los Angeles Superior Court, within hours after this Court issued a facially innocuous notice unsealing the declaration of Montgomery. But that declaration still contains multiple redactions. This may have consequences in connection with statements made by Montgomery in his declaration involving multiple issues presently

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confronting this Court, some of which were heard on August 17th, and which are directly related to the injunctive relief sought in his frivolous California complaint. These include the attempted use of the redactions and related state secrets issues as defenses by Montgomery in various matters, *including a potential impact on counsel's right to defend himself in the California proceeding*. In order to avoid any possibility of such manipulation of the justice system, as well as prejudice to Montgomery, this Court should hear all of these matters - perhaps an unwanted burden, but necessary to the administration of justice. Counsel will *not* recount the *underlying* reasons, issues or facts why the redactions in the declaration may seriously impact these cases, and/or potentially foster manipulated defenses, and/or the specific facts why Ms. Pham and Klar are attempting to divert these issues to California on behalf of Ms. Blixseth. But the potential for delay, obfuscation and inconsistency is enormous. Ms. Pham and Ms. Klar represent and are being paid by Edra Blixseth.

The unsealed, redacted declaration of Montgomery raises issues and facts which substantially impact issues and facts on the work performed by counsel, decisions made by counsel throughout the 18 months of representation, particularly in the first few months in connection with the search matter, and related issues, particularly with regard to whether his source codes were "never on the premises of eTreppid," and whether a certain agency of the government interacted with Montgomery as he represented in his declaration. Given Montgomery's "demonstrations" to counsel in late January, early February, 2006, before the FBI raid, and performed from his lap top, which was subsequently seized by the FBI, and then subsequent demonstrations without the lap top, critical issues abound. Both the redacted material in the declaration and the unredacted material involves substantial work performed by counsel resulting in substantial fees and costs. This work is intertwined with these issues as reflected on counsel's invoices. If there is any challenge to any of those fees and costs, as a practical matter, only this Court is in a position to weave through the evidence, isolate protected material, and resolve the issues without compromising a just result. Otherwise, someone may be able to hide behind the redactions. Moreover, if Ms. Pham and Klar are truly representing Montgomery and not protecting Edra Blixseth, they would NEVER have brought the California action and set up Montgomery with demonstrably false allegations.

As of Friday, August 3rd, as seen in the unsealed declaration of Montgomery, the efficacy of

the technology is apparently now not a state secret, nor any type of secret. It is, however, relevant to

the two civil cases now pending in this Court, it is directly relevant to Mr. Flynn's emails, discussions

and dealings with Montgomery, it is relevant to the materials redacted therein and the state secrets

privilege, it is relevant to the attorney client privilege, it is relevant to counsel's unpaid fees and costs

and the accompanying huge amount of time expended in both civil cases and the search case based on

counsel's belief that dire national security issues were at stake; and that wide spread corruption was

afoot, which seemed eminently plausible given Montgomery's possession of documents and emails

D. <u>Factual, legal, investigatory, and ethical Issues before this Court.</u>

and electronic media given by him to the media.

Also inextricably involved in the foregoing issues are Mr. Flynn's *potentially conflicting* duties under the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct relating to the attorney client privilege and his duty to take "remedial measures" under Rule 3.3 (a) (3) (b); his withdrawal (formally opposed by Montgomery for a month while Montgomery delayed bringing in new counsel, and informally opposed for longer than that); and Mr. Flynn's obligations to provide advice and information to Montgomery, his "partners," including Edra Blixseth, and to local Nevada counsel, from approximately May, 2007 to August 1, 2007. These issues involve fees and costs sought here and the "gag" order presently sought in California. The withdrawal issues involve multiple, complex, *ongoing* issues (some of them public) involving the "partners," including Ms. Blixseth, who initiated and prompted Montgomery's very public media blitz. These issues also all involve Mr. Flynn's unpaid fees and costs.

Mr. Flynn's fees and costs also relate to the Grand Jury proceedings in Washington D.C. before new counsel took over in late May, 2007 at Mr. Flynn's insistence. Substantial time and costs were devoted to said matter and in connection with Mr. Flynn's cooperation with the Washington FBI.

E. This Court is the proper venue.

Venue rules balance the convenience of the parties with other policy factors in selecting an appropriate forum for trial. *Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen* (1967) 387 U.S. 556, 560. Federal venue is governed entirely by statute, *Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.* (1979) 443 U.S. 173, 181, and the venue rules are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 28 U.S.C. § 1404, 1406.

Venue is only proper in the following judicial districts: a district where all defendants reside, 28 U.S.C. §1391(a)(1); OR a district in which a "substantial part of the events or omissions" on which the claim is based occurred, or where is located a "substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action," 28 U.S.C. §1391(a)(2); OR if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought, "a district in which the action by otherwise be found, a "district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. §1391(a)(3)[so-called residual venue.]. Mr. Flynn has a residence in San Diego County, California, and is domiciled in Massachusetts. He does not have a residence in the District for the Central District of California.

Based upon the above law, and the existing complaint, venue is proper in U.S. District Court, Nevada, Reno or even Las Vegas (where Judge Pro is based), not Los Angeles. A "substantial part of the events or omissions" giving rise to Montgomery's allegations occurred in Nevada. 28 U.S.C. §1391(a)(2) and (b)(2). Plaintiffs even admit that the underlying cases in this dispute with their former attorney involve "Nevada actions;" and they have put before the Nevada Court the same relief they seek in their complaint filed in Los Angeles Superior court, so they are not entitled to forum shop and seek duplicate rulings on the same issues.

Also, the Montgomerys, presently citizens of Washington have consented to the jurisdiction of U.S. District Court of Nevada, in the related Nevada actions. Therefore, they should be precluded from running to Los Angeles State Court in a disingenuous effort to obtain a different ruling.

F. The fees and costs are recoverable under at least five legal theories.

- 1. Express promises to pay the hourly fees charged. The attached declaration of counsel recites the numerous written promises to pay the hourly fees and costs rendered in counsel's invoices. These promises were made over a period of 16 months in numerous emails from Montgomery, Edra Blixseth and other Opsprings executives including the president, Michael Sandoval. Counsel were told by all parties to perform whatever work was necessary to fully protect their rights. Counsel performed the work pursuant to the written promises and Montgomery has never challenged his written promises to pay. In fact, he has repeatedly endorsed them over a period of 18 months up through June 11, 2007. The written promises constitute an agreement to pay for the invoiced services.
 - 2. Implied promises to pay the hourly fees charged. Where there is an "ongoing

relationship" in which fees are charged for services and paid without objection, then not paid, also without objection, the law implies a promise to pay the reasonable value of the work. *Checker, Inc.* v_Zeman_* 86 Nev. 216; 467 P.2d 100 (1970). Here, counsel had an ongoing relationship with Montgomery, who received and approved of the services without objection. The law implies a promise to pay the reasonable value of the services.

3. Quantum Meruit on a common count. It is established under Nevada law that an attorney can recover his fees and costs under the legal principle of quantum meruit. *Berrum v Georgetta*, 60 Nev. 1; 93 P.2d 525 (1839). The Ninth Circuit has approved quantum meruit recovery by attorneys under very diverse circumstances involving unsigned agreements, signed agreements, and no agreements whatsoever, all in one case. *Fitzsimmons v St. Paul Title Ins. Co.*, 51 B.R. 600; 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 6464. Unjust enrichment or resulting benefit based on the reasonable value of the services performed are established elements in a claim for quantum meruit. *Id.* An implied contract is also recognized as a basis the basis for a quantum meruit claim: where services are performed at the request of another and there is no express promise of payment, the law implies a promise to pay the reasonable value of the services. *Whiteman v Brandis*, 78 Nev. 320, 321; 372 P.2d 468, 469 (1962).

Here the facts set forth in the attached declaration of counsel mandate a quantum meruit finding *in some amount* based on the reasonable value of the services as a matter of law.

- **4.** Counsel have a claim on an "account stated." Where attorneys render services over a period of time and the clients are informed of their bills, the client is liable under a theory of an "account stated." Old West Enterprises, Inc. v Reno escrow Co., 86 Nev. 727; 476 P.2d 1 (1970); Nilsson v Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538 (9th Cir., 1988). Here, as set forth in the attached declaration, counsel rendered services over a period of 18 months, received partial payments, the clients never objected to the bills, so the amounts billed are due and payable.
- **5.** Counsel have a claim for Fraud. Counsel will not recite the facts supporting this claim at this time.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, this Motion should be granted and counsel should be paid the sum of \$608,959.59, the total on the last bill as of July 10, 2007, plus additional fees, costs and interest,

	Case 3:06-cv-00056-PMP-VPC Document 248 Filed 08/21/07 Page 21 of 21
1	since said invoice, all totaling approximately \$650,000.00. A final amount will be invoiced to the
2	Montgomery attorneys. If the Montgomery parties dispute it, the final invoice will be submitted to the
3	Court together with all other invoices. Counsel is not submitting them at this time to avoid prejudice
4	to the Montgomerys as recited an the attached declaration of counsel.
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7	Dated: Aug. 21, 2007 Respectfully submitted,
8	/S/Michael Flynn, Esq.
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